Knight v. City of New York

24-977 Knight v. City of New York

United States Court of Appeals For the Second Circuit

August Term 2025

Argued: December 8, 2025 Decided: January 13, 2026

No. 24-977

CAVALIER D. KNIGHT, Managing Member of Cavalier Knight LLC,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

CITY OF NEW YORK, JESSICA TISCH, as the Statutory Handgun Licensing Officer and the Police Commissioner of New York City, and her successors in office,

Defendants-Appellees. *

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York No. 22-cv-3215, Valerie E. Caproni, Judge.

Before: CHIN, SULLIVAN, and KAHN, Circuit Judges.

* The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to amend the official case caption as set forth above. Cavalier D. Knight, a would-be gun dealer residing in New York City, appeals from an order of the district court dismissing for lack of Article III standing his challenges to two New York City regulations governing the purchase and sale of firearms. The first regulation prohibits purchasers from buying more than one gun every ninety days. See N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 10-302.1(b) (“No person shall acquire a firearm if such person has acquired a firearm within the previous ninety days.”). The second requires applicants for firearms dealer licenses to “maintain a place of business in the city,” id. § 10-302(c)(1), which effectively requires the applicant to maintain a brick-and-mortar location, see 38 R.C.N.Y. § 4-03(k), (t)(1), (t)(3)–(5). Knight alleges that both regulations violate the Second Amendment as well as various other federal and state constitutional and statutory provisions.

The magistrate judge to whom the case had been referred, the Honorable Valerie Figueredo, recommended that the district court dismiss Knight’s complaint either for lack of Article III standing or, in the alternative, for failure to state a claim. The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation regarding standing and thus declined to reach the magistrate judge’s recommendation concerning whether Knight had alleged sufficient facts to state a claim. For the following reasons, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Knight’s challenges to the ninety-day rule, vacate its dismissal of his challenges to the place-of-business requirement, and remand for the district court to consider in the first instance the merits of his challenges to the latter provision.

AFFIRMED IN PART AND VACATED IN PART.

CAVALIER D. KNIGHT, pro se, New York, NY.

CHASE HENRY MECHANICK (Devin Slack, Martin K. Rowe III, on the brief), for Muriel Goode-Trufant, Acting Corporation Counsel, New York City Law Department, New York, NY, for Defendants- Appellees.

2 PER CURIAM:

Cavalier D. Knight, a would-be gun dealer residing in New York City,

appeals from an order of the district court dismissing for lack of Article III standing

his challenges to two New York City regulations governing the purchase and sale

of firearms. The first regulation prohibits purchasers from buying more than one

gun every ninety days. See N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 10-302.1(b) (“No person shall

acquire a firearm if such person has acquired a firearm within the previous ninety

days.”). The second requires applicants for firearms dealer licenses to “maintain

a place of business in the city,” id. § 10-302(c)(1), which effectively requires the

applicant to maintain a brick-and-mortar location, see 38 R.C.N.Y. § 4-03(k), (t)(1),

(t)(3)–(5). Knight alleges that both regulations violate the Second Amendment as

well as various other federal and state constitutional and statutory provisions.

The magistrate judge to whom the case had been referred, the Honorable

Valerie Figueredo, recommended that the district court dismiss Knight’s

complaint either for lack of Article III standing or, in the alternative, for failure to

state a claim. The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation

regarding standing and thus declined to reach the magistrate judge’s

recommendation concerning whether Knight had alleged sufficient facts to state a

3 claim. For the following reasons, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of

Knight’s challenges to the ninety-day rule, vacate its dismissal of his challenges to

the place-of-business requirement, and remand for the district court to consider in

the first instance the merits of his challenges to the latter provision.

I. Standard of Review

We review de novo a district court’s dismissal of a complaint for lack of

Article III standing. Citizens United to Protect Our Neighborhoods v. Vill. of Chestnut

Ridge, 98 F.4th 386, 391 (2d Cir. 2024). At the pleading stage, the plaintiff must

“allege[] facts that affirmatively and plausibly suggest that [he] has standing to

sue.” Carter v. HealthPort Techs., LLC, 822 F.3d 47, 56 (2d Cir. 2016) (internal

quotation marks omitted). In determining whether a plaintiff has carried that

burden, we assume that all well-pleaded factual allegations in the operative

complaint are true and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. Id.

Where, as here, a non-lawyer plaintiff chooses to represent himself, “his pleadings

and other filings are interpreted to raise the strongest claims they suggest.”

Sharikov v. Philips Med. Sys. MR, Inc., 103 F.4th 159, 166 (2d Cir. 2024).

In reviewing the magistrate judge’s recommendation to dismiss Knight’s

complaint for lack of standing, the district court determined that the clear-error

4 standard applied and that, in the alternative, Knight’s objections thereto failed

under de novo review. As we recently explained, a district court may review a

report and recommendation for clear error when a party’s “objections are

nonspecific or merely perfunctory responses argued in an attempt to engage the

district court in a rehashing of the same arguments set forth in the original

petition.” Nambiar v. Cent. Orthopedic Grp., LLP, 158 F.4th 349, 361 (2d Cir. 2025)

(internal quotation marks omitted). But “[w]here a litigant’s objections take issue

with a specific legal conclusion in the report and recommendation, they should be

considered de novo, even if they repeat an argument raised before the magistrate

judge.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

With respect to Knight’s challenges to the ninety-day requirement, the

district court accurately observed that Knight’s objections were “unrelated to

Judge Figueredo’s conclusions” or were otherwise “perfunctory, conclusory, and

not substantive.” Sp. App’x at 18. Thus, the district court correctly reviewed

that portion of the report and recommendation for clear error.

The same cannot be said of Knight’s challenges to the place-of-business

requirement. In objecting to the magistrate judge’s recommendation, Knight

argued that his inability to obtain a dealer license exposed him to a “risk [of]

5 criminal prosecution” if he started his business; he also argued that the magistrate

judge had “misunderst[ood]” the nature of his injury, which he claimed was

redressable through an order granting his “requested relief” – namely, an

injunction requiring Defendants to grant him a state dealer license. Dist. Ct. Doc.

No. 93 at 27, 34. Although somewhat cryptically presented, these objections were

enough to warrant de novo review of the portion of the report recommending

dismissal of Knight’s challenges to the place-of-business requirement, especially

given the liberal standard under which his submissions must be read. See

Whitfield v. City of New York, 96 F.4th 504, 518 (2d Cir. 2024).

II. Discussion

To satisfy Article III’s standing requirement, “a plaintiff must demonstrate:

(1) injury-in-fact, which means ‘an actual or imminent’ and ‘concrete and

particularized’ harm to a ‘legally protected interest’; (2) causation of the injury,

which means that the injury is ‘fairly traceable’ to the challenged action of the

defendant; and (3) redressability, which means that it is ‘likely,’ not speculative,

that a favorable decision by a court will redress the injury.” Nat. Res. Def. Council

v. Nat'l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 894 F.3d 95, 103 (2d Cir. 2018) (quoting Lujan

v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992)). For an injury in fact to be concrete

6 and particularized, it must “actually exist” and “affect the plaintiff in a personal

and individual way.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 339–40 (2016) (internal

quotation marks omitted). “Because ‘standing is not dispensed in gross,’ a

plaintiff ‘must demonstrate standing for each claim that he presses and for each

form of relief that he seeks (for example, injunctive relief and damages).’” Doe v.

Hochul, 139 F.4th 165, 185 (2d Cir. 2025) (alterations adopted) (quoting TransUnion

LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 431 (2021)).

The district court correctly held that Knight failed to allege an Article III

injury attributable to the ninety-day rule. Knight does not allege that he

personally wishes to buy more than one gun every ninety days. Instead, he

appears to claim that the ninety-day rule injures him economically by decreasing

the rate at which potential customers could lawfully purchase firearms from him.

But Knight does not allege that he actually has (or imminently will have) a single

New York City customer whose efforts to purchase firearms from him are stymied

by the ninety-day rule. Accordingly, Knight’s complaint does not plausibly show

that the ninety-day rule affects him in a “personal and individual way.” Spokeo,

578 U.S. at 339 (internal quotation marks omitted). The district court therefore

correctly dismissed Knight’s challenges to the ninety-day rule for lack of standing.

7 We reach a different conclusion, however, with respect to the district court’s

dismissal of Knight’s challenges to the place-of-business requirement. As

alleged, the City informed Knight that without a brick-and-mortar location, he

would be ineligible for a dealer license. The district court, however, held that this

aspect of Knight’s claim is not redressable because even with a dealer license,

unchallenged New York City zoning provisions would prohibit Knight’s

contemplated business. As the magistrate judge observed, Knight plans to

handle the administrative aspects of his business from his Manhattan apartment

while storing his inventory at an off-site location. But under the City’s zoning

laws, a residence may not be used to sell products manufactured elsewhere than

in the home and offsite storage of inventory is prohibited. See N.Y.C. Zoning

Resolution §§ 12-10, 22-10. According to the district court and magistrate judge,

any prospective relief with respect to the place-of-business requirement would

therefore make no material difference to Knight’s ability to run his business. We

disagree, and conclude that the district court’s understanding of Knight’s alleged

injuries, and thus of its ability to provide effective relief, was too narrow.

It is well-established that a credible threat of criminal prosecution can give

rise to a discrete, redressable injury under Article III. See Susan B. Anthony List v.

8 Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149, 158–59 (2014). To demonstrate such an injury, the plaintiff

must “allege[] an intention to engage in a course of conduct arguably affected with

a constitutional interest, but proscribed by a statute, and [that] there exists a

credible threat of prosecution thereunder.” Id. at 159 (internal quotation marks

omitted); see Vitagliano v. County of Westchester, 71 F.4th 130, 136 (2d Cir. 2023).

Here, Knight alleges just such an injury. He plans to run a commercial gun

dealing business in New York and has taken several concrete steps toward that

goal, including obtaining a federal firearms license and consulting with federal

and local agencies regarding his contemplated business. Because the commercial

availability of firearms is often “necessary to a citizen’s effective exercise of Second

Amendment rights,” Gazzola v. Hochul, 88 F.4th 186, 196 (2d Cir. 2023), Knight’s

proposed course of conduct is at least arguably affected with a constitutional

interest. But without the dealer license Knight seeks – which he cannot obtain by

virtue of the challenged place-of-business requirement – such conduct is

specifically prohibited by state law. See N.Y. Penal Law § 400.00(1-a), (16).

Knight therefore has plausibly alleged that if he starts running his business

without a dealer license, he will face a credible threat of criminal prosecution. See

Vitagliano, 71 F.4th at 138 (explaining that a credible threat of prosecution may be

9 presumed “where a statute specifically proscribes conduct” in which the plaintiff

intends to engage (alteration adopted and internal quotation marks omitted)).

Indeed, Knight alleges that a City law-enforcement official personally threatened

him with criminal prosecution for unlicensed gun dealing.

Because Knight’s vulnerability to criminal prosecution for running an

unlicensed gun business gives rise to a cognizable Article III injury, we next

consider whether that injury is plausibly redressable through his challenges to the

place-of-business requirement. It is.

Redressability depends on the substance of the plaintiff’s claims and the

breadth of relief sought in his complaint. See Gutierrez v. Saenz, 606 U.S. 305, 316–

19 (2025). Here, Knight alleges that the lack of a dealer license will expose him to

a risk of criminal prosecution if he starts up his contemplated gun business and

that the reason why he cannot obtain a dealer license is Defendants’ enforcement

of the place-of-business requirement. Knight’s requested injunction requiring

Defendants to grant him a dealer license (or simply requiring them to evaluate his

license application without requiring a brick-and-mortar location) is therefore

likely to relieve him of the threat of felony prosecution for running an unlicensed

gun dealership. See N.Y. Penal Law § 265.20(10) (generally exempting licensed

10 dealers from New York’s criminal laws against the commercial sale and possession

of firearms); id. § 400.00(1-a) (authorizing licensed dealers to engage in the

commercial sale of firearms). Eliminating that significant threat of criminal

prosecution would provide Knight with a sufficiently meaningful benefit to satisfy

Article III’s redressability prong. See Vitagliano, 71 F.4th at 140.

The possibility that Knight could still be subject to enforcement proceedings

under the City’s zoning laws does not defeat redressability. To satisfy Article III,

a plaintiff must show that his requested relief would provide meaningful redress

for an injury, not that it would relieve him of every injury. Am. Cruise Lines v.

United States, 96 F.4th 283, 286 (2d Cir. 2024) (citing Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228,

243 n.15 (1982)). And even when a plaintiff’s requested relief “cannot provide

full redress” with respect to an injury, a federal court’s “ability to effectuate a

partial remedy satisfies the redressability requirement.” Uzuegbunam v.

Preczewski, 592 U.S. 279, 291 (2021) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Elias

Bochner, 287 7th Ave. Realty LLC v. City of New York, 118 F.4th 505, 521 (2d Cir. 2024)

(“[T]he law of standing does not require that the relief sought by a plaintiff

completely redress the asserted injury.”). We therefore agree with the well-

reasoned view of the Seventh and Eighth Circuits that a district court’s ability to

11 reduce the plaintiff’s aggregate criminal exposure can satisfy redressability. See

Reps. Comm. for Freedom of the Press v. Rokita, 147 F.4th 720, 729 (7th Cir. 2025)

(“[R]emoving an additional layer of criminal liability [is] a form of redress

sufficient to confer standing, even though the underlying behavior [is] still subject

to prosecution.”); Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Reynolds, 89 F.4th 1071, 1078 (8th Cir.

2024) (similar).

Here, with a dealer license in hand, Knight could not be criminally

prosecuted for unlicensed commercial gun dealing. Thus, his risk of prosecution

“would be reduced to some extent,” even if not eliminated entirely, if he had a

dealer license. Massachusetts v. Env’t Prot. Agency, 549 U.S. 497, 526 (2007). And

in the event that the City were to target Knight for separate violations of its zoning

laws, the range of possible penalties would likely be lower than the penalties he

would face for being an unlicensed gun dealer. Compare, e.g., N.Y. Penal Law

§ 265.13(2) (class B felony to sell a total of three or more firearms in any one-year

period), with N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 28-203.1 (misdemeanor offense to commit an

“immediately hazardous” zoning violation; even lower penalties for “major

violation[s]” and “lesser violation[s]”). We also observe that Knight has

consistently taken the position in this litigation that the City’s zoning laws would

12 not bar his contemplated gun business. Knight may be wrong about that, but it is

the lack of a dealer license – and the attendant threat of criminal prosecution for

running an unlicensed gun dealership – that matters for purposes of the

redressability of his asserted injury, not a local zoning restriction. 1

Accordingly, Knight has plausibly alleged that his asserted injury – a risk of

criminal prosecution for running an unlicensed gun business – is redressable

through his challenges to the place-of-business requirement. And for that reason,

Knight has also satisfied Article III’s traceability requirement. See Food & Drug

Admin. v. All. for Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. 367, 380 (2024) (“The second and third

standing requirements—causation and redressability—are often flip sides of the

same coin.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

III. CONCLUSION

For these reasons, we agree with the district court that Knight lacks Article

III standing to challenge the ninety-day rule but conclude that he has sufficiently

1 Defendants suggest in passing that section 400.00(1-a) and (8) of the Penal Law would independently prevent them from granting Knight a dealer license. See N.Y. Penal Law § 400.00(1-a) (requiring applicants to “maintain a place of business in the city or county where the license is issued”); id. § 400.00(8) (providing that “[a] license as gunsmith or dealer in firearms shall be prominently displayed on the licensed premises”). But the Penal Law does not, by its terms, exclude residences from the definition of a place of business. And in any event, Knight’s complaint seeks relief from “all . . . laws, regulations, policies, practices and customs” related to the place-of-business requirement. Dist. Ct. Doc. No. 62 ¶ 184 (emphasis added); see Schoenthal v. Raoul, 150 F.4th 889, 905–06 (7th Cir. 2025) (crediting similar allegations).

13 alleged standing to challenge the place-of-business requirement. We therefore

affirm the district court’s dismissal of Knight’s challenges to the ninety-day rule,

vacate the district court’s dismissal of his challenges to the place-of-business

requirement, and remand this case for further proceedings.

14